The definition of dreams in the human philosophy
Whenever we are aware of anything, whether it be the fire in front of us or otherwise, this is firm evidence that we are awake and that the world presented to us is as it really is. Descartes II. Though sleeping individuals are too wrapped up in the absurdity of their dreams to be able to distinguish their states, an individual who is awake can tell, simply because the absurdity is no longer there during wakefulness.
Tsoukalas claims that this theory integrates many earlier findings into a unified framework.
Dream philosophy quotes
On the received view, the memory of an earlier dream is caused by the earlier dream experience and is the second time the content is experienced. In order to escape this persistent vulnerability to skepticism, the imagination theorist would have to deny not just that dream beliefs, but also that wonderings, thoughts, affirmation etc. A possible problem for both views is their reliance on background assumptions about the phenomenology of dreaming and its association with REM sleep, which are, as we have seen, both quite controversial cf. LaBerge carried out a further experiment in which the timing of dreams was measured from within the dream. If I simply form a mental representation of a blond Hollywood actor, the features of the representation might be too vague to pick out any particular individual. This however places a considerable burden on the imagination theory, and while one might want to accept that dream beliefs are too defective to count as real ones, the same might not be true for mere instances of thinking or wondering. He talks of his success in quelling sexual thoughts and earlier habits from his life before his religious conversion. Revonsuo 84 This claim is central to the virtual reality metaphor of dreaming, according to which consciousness itself is essentially dreamlike in that even in wakefulness, perceptual experience is a kind of online hallucination see also Metzinger , A lucid dream, unlike ordinary dreams, is defined strictly in terms of the advanced epistemic status of the dreamer — the individual is having a lucid dream if they are aware that he or she is dreaming Green, p. Contrary to his remarks in the First Meditation, he notes that dreams are in fact quite different from waking experiences, for instance in that they are only rarely connected to waking memories and in that persons may suddenly appear or disappear in dreams.
It might be useful to look at one report of the memory of a lucid dream: In a dangerous part of San Francisco, for some reason I start crawling on the sidewalk. Both also argue that imagery and percepts are sharply distinguished, claiming that imagining and perceiving are different kinds of mental states that cannot be meaningfully placed on a continuum.
As inherently first personal and retrospective reports, or so Malcolm alleges, the dream report fails Wittgensteinian criteria of being potentially verified as experiences. Alternatively, dreams may have been either black-and white or colored all along, with media exposure only changing the way people report their dreams.
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